Naturalism's Link to Humanism

Not All Metaphysics of Naturalism

Are Created Equal

One of the problems I have with other authors' definitions of "naturalism" is that I often see what appears to be mistakes, albeit sometimes they are small. But they become untenable with the larger context of that author's message, because until the mistake is fixed, the reader (me in this case) doesn't know what to make of it. So I write to the author and I ask for clarification.

On the Home Page of the Secular Web, a naturalistic and humanistic website, Paul Draper is quoted as saying that naturalism is "the hypothesis that the natural world is a closed system, which means that nothing that is not part of the natural world affects it." The conclusion is then made that, "Thus, 'naturalism implies that there are no supernatural entities."

Well, no it does not imply that, not as written.

To say "nothing that is not part of the natural world" leaves open the possibility, for anyone who thinks there is more than the natural world, of a thing that exists that is more than the natural world--like God. Mr. Draper leaves an open hole. I would have thought that leaving open such holes are mistakes of epistemology--or simply a gaffe of grammar or syntax, or even one of thinking faster than the pen can write.

It seems untenable with the larger message to leave such a hole.

So I wrote to Mr. Draper and asked him about the it. It seems it not a hole in his opinion, and is intentional and correct by his metrics of naturalism. It is a question, not of epistemology, in his mind, but of metaphysics.

"The statement," replied Draper, "that the universe is a closed system does imply that there are no supernatural entities because a supernatural entity is defined as a non-natural entity that AFFECTS THE NATURAL WORLD. Thus, naturalism as defined in the quoted passage rules out supernatural entities but does not rule in or out non-natural entities." [emphasis his]

The supernatural is defined as non-natural, yet this published naturalist author concedes that the non-natural may exist? And, isn't Draper's idea that no supernatural entities exist exactly what I said was implied?

Mr. Draper is an educated man and qualified as far as his peers are concerned, I'm certain, to be held in esteem, to be a published author, and to be the editor of Philo, "published biannually at the Center for Inquiry with assistance from Purdue University," reads the home page of the online magazine, concluding with: "Philo is the publication of the Society of Humanist Philosophers."

Interestingly, I found nothing in the Google search engine for the Society, except an ancient reference to Philo before Draper was Editor; and the remark in Wikipedia that it is a program of the Council for Secular Humanism.

The Council is responsible for many things. Originally called the Council for Democratic and Secular Humanism, it was begun by Paul Kurtz a naturalist humanist. "The council acts as an umbrella organization for a number of other groups, such as the Committee for the Scientific Examination of Religion, Secular Organizations for Sobriety, African Americans for Humanism, and provides support for Center for Inquiry - On Campus. It also publishes several magazines and newsletters, including Free Inquiry," states Wikipedia.

Kurtz calls his form of humanistic naturalism "philosophical." Michael Friedman of the American Philosophical Association says this "philosophical" form "has reached the end of its useful life."

I am not a humanist of any sort. www.jcn.com/humanism.html lists 8 sorts. About secular humanism it says it is "an outgrowth of 18th century enlightenment rationalism and 19th century freethought." That ought to say something to those who understand rationalism. And freethought explains the slippery language used by humanists and by scientific and philosophical naturalists. While elevating science and reason, freethought does so at the cost of a rational metaphysics.

The website for the Council supports most of what Wiki states about it, and also makes this declaration:

"Secular humanists reject supernatural and authoritarian beliefs. They affirm that we must take responsibility for our own lives and the communities and world in which we live. Secular humanism emphasizes reason and scientific inquiry, individual freedom and responsibility, human values and compassion, and the need for tolerance and cooperation." [emphasis added]

Gee. I just wrote about this on Tuesday. It's kind of strange, sometimes, how the world goes around. The subjects that secular humanism "emphasizes"--reason, science, individualism, responsibility, human values, and compassion--are defined by that movement very differently from Metaphysical Naturalism. But what does it have to do with Paul Draper's differentiation between "supernatural" and "non-natural" entities?

To begin with, this: I never seem to be able to get answers from naturalists like Mr. Draper that make much sense to me. It all seems gray, undifferentiated by any substantiality, or it seems like metaphysical double-speak that goes round and round, stopping only long enough to get in the phrases "tolerance," "compassion," and a few others with similiar altruistic connotations--and they do mean it altruistically as I will show; there is nothing about justice connected to their phrases for "cooperation".

When I answered Tom Clark's critique of my comments to him about naturalism, he did not come back with analyses about what I had written. Apparently he couldn't match me logic for logic. Instead, he wrote, among other things:

"Ok, many thanks for these clarifications, most interesting. It would be nice if all [Ayn] Rand’s acolytes examined her philosophy as assiduously as do you, ending up with more nuanced conclusions about the legitimacy of compassion and limits of egoism." [emphasis added]

My "nuanced conclusions" on those subjects were that compassion was worthless in the wrong circumstances, and that there are no limits to egoism when defined as "rational egoism."

Clark is a dedicated humanist, and some of the contributors to his site also contribute to Philo. It seems, from the other things Clark wrote me, that humanists cannot accept egoism because they exalt altrusim.

"There are two errors," he writes about my ideas, "in addition to thinking we’re ultimately self-made. One is to suppose that in empirical fact we are merely self-interested creatures. But we aren’t; there are many altruistic bones in our body. Second, it’s to commit the naturalistic fallacy of arguing that if we are selfish by nature, that means we should be selfish. But there is no direct implication from a natural is to an ethical ought."

Humanists take issue with Rand's clear disdain of altruism. I accept her disdain completely, because she did not allow the definition to become watered down by humanistic definitions that make it seem as if "altruism" is merely being human to one another. Rand fiercely upheld Compte's definition; after all, it was Compte who coined the word.

"For Comte Altruism meant the [ ] eradication of self-centered desire, and a life devoted to the good of others; more particularly, selfless love..." [emphasis added] http://www.ditext.com/runes/a.html Devotion to the good of others when coupled with selfless love--a contradiction in terms--is duty, and duty has nothing to do with rational compassion, yet such irrational duty is the field of secular and other forms of humanism.

I replied to Clark that "'to commit the naturalistic fallacy of arguing that if we are selfish by nature, that means we should be selfish,' is the definition of 'logical' egoism," not rational egoism which Rand knew was the necessary form of egoism for man to lead a rational life. http://www.iep.utm.edu/e/egoism.htm

Which leads us to the rationality of humanists and scientific and philosophical naturalists. Every concept has only one antonym, though many words are connected to more than one concept, so you must choose your concept carefully. Sometimes, depending on the way a dictionary has separated concepts, the differences are unclear. Definition 2) may seem to one's logic to be the same as 3). Such differences are subtle and sometimes not even legitimate.

But if the ontological concept of "natural" has the antonym of "not-natural", then "supernatural" must be a sub-set of "not-natural." Mr. Draper does not see it that way.

"I define a 'natural entity'," he wrote, "as an entity that is either physical or that is causally or ontologically reducible to physical entities. Skyscrapers, for example, are natural entities by this technical definition. There are, of course, other senses of the word 'natural' in ordinary language."

So far I agree, but then he went on: "Non-natural entities by my definition are entities that are not physical and are not reducible to physical entities. Perhaps abstract objects are non-natural, but that's debatable."

Since abstract objects are concepts of human thought rather than Platonic Forms, and since thought is natural, I would refuse to debate it. He does not make clear what any other objects are that he might define as "not physical and not reducible to physical entities."

"The supernatural is a subcategory of the non-natural", he continued, a complete reversal of my Metaphysical Naturalist position. "If there were any supernatural entities, then they would be entities that, in spite of not being natural, nevertheless affect natural entities."

The way I see it, God, if He exists, is natural, not supernatural. Why should we see Him as anything other than natural? We see Him as supernatural because then we do not find ourselves able to have empirical evidence of God, and we do not want empirical evidence, except perhaps for the indirect kind. Ronald Reagan's comparison of the physical world to a dinner table laden with food--that had no chef--comes to mind. The physical world "revealed" to our senses are all the evidence that supernaturalists say we can ever have, unless they are also of the opinion that revealed revelations e.g. Paul's experience on the road to Damascus, are possible.

However, Mr Draper tells me, "For while we have empirical evidence that the natural world is closed (our success in discovering natural causes of natural entities), it would be idle metaphysical speculation to claim that no non-natural entities exist."

From this we can infer than Mr. Draper knows of no non-natural entities, yet insists that the category must remain an open one in order not to "idly speculate" that the category is empty of entities!

This is the road that humanism plows, one of metaphysical mud and muck from which no logic can be ascertained except that of definitions with no clear denotations; and capitulation to the idea that clarity is egoistical and egoism must be "logical" rather than "rational" and therefor must be rejected (despite a very big difference between them); that egoism is the opposite of altrusim (which it is) and, that altruism is the metaphysical mud and muck that humanists prefer in their metaphysics over any form of egoism.

They do, after all, accuse Rand of being "black and white," "too concrete," and even "irrational."

Objectivists "strike me as being pretty irrational when it comes to ideas about the self and free will," Clark wrote to me, "and it seems to me this irrationality supports a morally objectionable radical individualism, see my critique here."

I will let his critique stand on its own, and see whether or not I can pull my feet out of humanism's muck without losing my shoes. If the category "non-natural entities" is an empty category, yet it contains a sub-category (supernatural,) then I can walk on water.

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Sci Naturalism's Unintended Link to Xianity

Scientific Naturalism and Christian Theology

Come from the Same Roots of Causality

I

Free will and the will that is not contra-causal are the subject of the metaphysics of naturalism. Metaphysical Naturalism (MN) accepts free will, denying--where scientific naturalism (SN) asserts--that free will needs to be "contra-causal" to be called free.

It is not, nor can it ever be, contra-causal. To wish it so, to want it so, to propose that it must be so before it can be called free is to contradict the very nature of naturalism's epistemic roots.

What is "contra causality"? To have contra-causal will, you would have to have the power to move the wind and the stars; the power to control your genetic pool--before you are conceived; the power to manipulate your environment by supernatural means (since we are obviously able to manipulate it by natural means, yet this isn't good enough for SN, which denies anything supernatural); and to manipulate the behavior and activities of every minute detail of reality that touches your own existence.

Because you do not and cannot have this power, SN says free will is not free because it is always influenced by something; the wind, the stars, your genetic pool, your environment, your prior actions, and the behavior and actions of all other people who have ever lived and who are living now, and whether or not you have a sore toe, a headache, have had too much caffein, alcohol, or milk--or are in need of some, and whether you are depressed, or manic, etc.

Even normality as measured by the strictest determinations of medicine and psychiatry effects us, according to SN, in such manner as to prevent our will from being free will. Normality no matter how it is determined is still the effect of all the previous causes of the being of any human.

In short SN asserts that the butterfly effect prevents what would otherwise be independent and free will, i.e., the freedom to think or not, and what to conclude from thought, and how to conclude it. The phrase "butterfly effect" is a "reference to the [ ] theory that a change in something seemingly innocuous, such as a flap of a butterfly's wings, may have unexpected larger consequences in the future, such as the path a tornado will travel."

We are caused by the flapping of all the butterflys' wings, whether those wings are literal, or metaphorical.

So while you may believe you are exercising free will, SN says the "you" that exists at the moment of exercising your will shows proof that "we are fully caused creatures" by all things that have gone before. "Naturalism holds that everything we are and do is connected to the rest of the world and derived from conditions that precede us and surround us," it says. [see same link as above]

The most notorious concept of our being "fully caused" is called, in Christianity, by the name "Original Sin." Christianity has always believed in "full causation" of the human being through Original Sin, but gives it an "out" through "redemption." For this reason Christianity believes in free will.

SN states its aim as being the obliteration of anything but scientism in its metaphysical description of the state of being human, yet it supports the most illogical of all epistemologic arguments of Christian theology, proving that even SN cannot escape epistemological mistakes that put it on par with the worst logic of supernaturalism. What SN does it takes away the ability to be "redeemed" from our "full causation" by removing the concept of freedom from the concept of will power.

SN does not disprove the Christian epistemology of Original Sin, it upholds it by using the same logic of "full causality"!

But in its defence, it must be explicitly stated that SN denies anything supernatural. It cannot therefor uphold the idea of Original Sin as a religious concept, but by using the very logic of Christian theology it gives Christianity very good reason to support the epistemology of SN while denying its metaphysics, in the very same way SN denies the metaphysics of religion.

Scientific Naturalism is Not Scientifically, But Epistemologically, Wrong

II

While it is entirely true that humans are shaped by such things as their gene pool and their environment, and by all the other things that science is beginning to teach us about our biology, this does not constitute what SN calls "full causation." It is not necessary for the will to be able to change these things for the will to exist as free will. Free will does not mean independence from existence.

Yet it is the independent, libertarian will that SN says is not free because it is not free from the reality of reality. "Naturalism," it say explicitly, "is the understanding that there is a single, natural world as shown by science, and that we are completely included in it."

Of course we are "completely included in it." While religion argues that we are also included in a supernatural world, it does not deny being "included" in the physical world. As a matter of fact, being released from this "complete inclusion" in the natural world is the goal of religion. SN seeks to bind us to it with no power to "fully cause" our own metaphysical existence.

SN does not state that the will is impotent. To the contrary, it states that since we know, or can know, the elements of reality that "fully cause" us to be who we are, that we can somehow control our lives better through of will power that it describes as "not free."

SN is a humanist movement. It supports "compassion" for criminals in their treatment and sentencing: compassion, not justice. Criminals are still human, have the capacity to learn from their wrongs and from their time incarcerated. Most will get out of prison. Ignoring "compassion" for justice does not mean going back to bread and water, chains and leg irons, beds of straw, lack of proper medicine, or anything that is not proper in the treatment of humans who have the free will to become better for the justice of their sentence. Proper treatment is justice, not compassion.

What SN means by "compassion" is stated this way: " Seeing that we are fully caused creatures - not self-caused - we can no longer take or assign ultimate credit or blame for what we do. This leads to an ethics of compassion and understanding, both toward ourselves and others. We see that there but for circumstances go I. We would have been the homeless person in front of us, the convict, or the addict, had we been given their genetic and environmental lot in life." [emphasis added]

This is all true, except for the "credit and blame" part. If the credit and blame are moral attributes of action, it is never true that they do not belong to us. If they are attributes of the chaos of reality over which we have no control, it is metaphysically unthinkable to assign credit or blame.

It is a case of barking up the wrong tree for SN to take note of "being fully included" in reality. No one has ever, to my knowledge, denied this. SN denies that we are included in any sort of super naturalism, and with that idea, metaphysical naturalism is in complete agreement.

If the unstated, implicit, and possibly unconscious goal of SN is some form of humanism be it termed "philosophical", "modern", or "secular", then it is not an honest doctrine, since it states its goal this way: "By understanding consciousness, choice, and even our highest capacities as materially based, naturalism re-enchants the physical world, allowing us to be at home in the universe." SN is a doctrine to "re-enchant" the world!

If its goal is to free us from supernaturalism, it forgot to "fully include" humanity in the reality of the fact that we would be absolutely nothing if not for reality itself. "In order to control nature, one must learn to obey nature."

It is in obeying nature that we find our will is free, and it is that freedom that has taken us out of the "inclusion" of being strictly bound to the earth, and opened the gateways to being "included" in the rest of the universe.

The Free Assemblage of Metaphysical Naturalists is the SM of
The Free Assemblage of Metaphysical Naturalists LLC.
The Academy of Metaphysical Naturalism TM,
The Academy of Metaphysical Naturalism Blogger TM, and
Academy of Metaphysical Naturalism Blogger Extra TM are the educational arms of the LLC and are:
© 2008 by Curtis Edward Clark and Naturalist Academy Publishing ®

mailto:freeassemblage@gmail.com

http://freeassemblage.blogspot.com/