Showing posts with label defeator. Show all posts
Showing posts with label defeator. Show all posts

Tuesday, June 29, 2010

What is a Belief System?

In any belief system, "system" is the operative word. A "system" must be functionally integrated in its metaphysics, its epistemology, its ethics, etc. This makes it into what is called "justified true belief". http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Justified_t… A system that is not functionally integrated will contain contradictions.
 
Justified true belief is also called the "tripartite" theory: "The theory states that if we believe something, have a justification for believing it, and it is true, then our belief is knowledge." [emphasis added] http://www.arrod.co.uk/essays/tripartite…

The part about a belief being "true" is also called the Correspondence Theory of Truth, which Aristotle and most other philosophers after him accepted as the proper standard for justified belief. Basically it says "p is true if and only if p corresponds to a fact". http://www.iep.utm.edu/truth/#H3 

But to be free of contradictions in any belief system--whether about going to the library, or about whether God exists or about what kind of God he/she is--it cannot be open to having holes punched it by other theories. Of course you can decide those other theories are wrong; but what if you see the logic and realize you have holes? You can close them up by listening to the criticism.

Hole-punching theories are called "defeasors". To have a "system" that is free of contradictions, you must be able to defeat the defeasors. This is called an "undefeated justified true belief." http://www.erin.utoronto.ca/~jnagel/333h…

Only when you believe your own system to be undefeasable can you have complete confidence in its integrity and its veracity.

Are there any such undefeated belief systems? Only the ones you believe in. Buddhists punch holes in Objectivism; Objectivists punch holes in Christianity; Christianity punches holes in monism; determinism punches non-determinism which is not necessarily the same as the belief in free-will; non-reductive theories punch holes in reductive theories; etc.

All of them are examples of belief systems. But they are based on what is known by the knower in the sense that the knower "knows P"; and we all "know" different things. This doesn't make all of them wrong. To the extent that they can be justified they are true.

But to the extent that you can defeat them with your own argument, they are not "justified".



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Tuesday, September 2, 2008

"Strong" vs. "Weak" Atheism; The Debacle of Categorization

I used to think I knew what "atheism" was. I was an atheist, someone who had no belief in god's existence, and no faith that he/it did exist and was the cause of "all things that are."

Then I discovered, through an article written by Austin Cline, in "About.Com" http://www.about.com/ (which is printed below,) that there were those in the atheist community who either thought I was a "weak" atheist, or perhaps not a "strong" atheist. This amazing judgment of my beliefs/disbeliefs was made even more evident by comments in a thread in About.Com. It was hinted that I might not be atheist at all!

I was questioned as to whether or not I believed in a god called "Ahura Mazda," whether I put him in the same "creator gods bucket" as "Jehovah, which I presume is the god you are most familiar with," and I wondered, what sort of idiot did it take to ask me that after I had stated there were no gods.

Then, I was questioned as to whether or not I believed Alexander the Great had actually lived, because he had been "deified," and there is no "requirement" that god's be supernatural, which of course Alexander was not, and if I didn't believe in "gods," how could I believe Alexander was real?

In the name of all that is Naturalistic, where does this crap come from? This bothers me.

It bothers me for several reasons. If I had not happened upon this article dealing with this subject, I could have remained ignorant of the debate, for who knows how long? It seems to be a recent--within the last decade--division. I'm not certain yet whether it is primarily an epistemological division, or one of metaphysics. I suspect there are advocates of boths sides of the division some of whom are dividing the atheists by metaphysics, and some on both sides dividing us with epistemics.

It bothers me that there are two sides in each "camp." "One should not increase, beyond what is necessary, the number of entities required to explain anything." [Occam's Razor] http://pespmc1.vub.ac.be/occamraz.html

It bothers me because a rose by any other name is still a rose. The difference between a rose and "atheism" is that a rose is merely empirical, while "atheism" is not empirical at all. So as far as the denotational divisions go, it is perfectly understandable. We are, sometimes, in differing "camps of particularities." There are so many divisions of "naturalist" and "naturalism" that I can't keep them straight.

Here is Cline's original article, with my [commentary,] with a live link at the bottom to the original:

"Atheism is commonly divided into two types: strong atheism and weak atheism. [Commonly by whom? Attribution would be nice.] Although only two categories, this distinction manages to reflect the broad diversity which exists among atheists when it comes to their positions on the existence of gods. [Only two categories, now, folks, but wait until he gets finished with his propositions. He will have us so divided--but then, he is no different than those among you who believe what he believes--that, a division of a division of a division, is more descriptive of "individualism," or of "diversity."

[I had always believed our "position" on the existence of god's existence was one of nullity, either that we said they don't exist and gave our reasons; or that we gave to the gods no heed, thus nullifying their influence over our thoughts and morals. Gods represent the reification of dogma.]

"Weak atheism, also sometimes referred to as implicit atheism [attribution?], is simply another name for the broadest and most general conception of atheism: the absence of belief in any gods. A weak atheist is someone who lacks theism and who does not happen to believe in the existence of any gods — no more, no less. This is also sometimes called agnostic atheism because most people who self-consciously lack belief in gods tend to do so for agnostic reasons."

[But according to the Law of Existence and the Law of Identity, "agnostic atheism" against the Law of Non-Contradiction, or the Law of Contradiction, which means: is a contradiction in terms.

[Weak atheism is also sometimes called the natural state of the newborn. Is a newborn to be considered a "weak atheist" if he grows up maintaining his nature-given natural metaphysics, i.e., metaphysics developed without the Primacy of Deity over-riding the Primacy of Sovereignty, whereby each unique human has sovereignty only over him/herself, an no sovereignty over others except of children, and legally with some others. And does it without ever giving it further consideration? We often make the claim that religion is taught or imposed by the society which adopts it; if an entire society failed to consider god's existence, would it be a "weak atheist" society?]
"Strong atheism, also sometimes referred to as explicit atheism, goes one step further and involves denying the existence of at least one god, usually multiple gods, and sometimes the possible existence of any gods at all.


[Wait--a "strong" atheist may be one who denies the "possibility" of gods--as opposed to only denying the existence of particular gods?

[If that is to be the definition of "strong," then we must also cordon off those who deny only particualar gods, from those deny the possibility of any gods. Denying the possibility is what I thought every atheistic proposition consisted of. Now I am told that an atheist can deny specific gods, without denying the possibility that "some" god may exist. That is agnosticism.

[Cline is About.Com's resident expert and blogger in the category of "Agnosticism/Atheism." His academic credentials are excellent, having studied here and in Europe and gaining several degrees; he is a Regional Director for the Council for Secular Humanism. So I would give Cline the benefit of the doubt and hope he simply "wasn't thinking" when he wrote that. I have made similar huried or unthought-out mistakes myself. There are several typos and other editorial mistakes in this piece because I formatted incorrectly then could not back out of it.

[But it is a major gaffe, because if someone uses it later to back up a debatable question, the answer is going to be wrong. You cannot fail to deny the possibility of all supernatural gods, and still be labeled "atheist."]

"Strong atheism is sometimes called “gnostic atheism” because people who take this position often incorporate knowledge claims into it — that is to say, they claim to know in some fashion that certain gods or indeed all gods do not or cannot exist.
"Because knowledge claims are involved, strong atheism carries an initial burden of proof which does not exist for weak atheism. Any time a person asserts that some god or any gods do not or cannot exist, they obligate themselves to support their claims."


[Oh! Now that you have decided to be a "strong" atheist who also claims to have epistemic proof that gods do not or that gods cannot exist--wait: either-or is one more division. Why didn't Cline think of it?--now that you have decided, then your atheism is to be more questionable i.e., defeatable,* than that of a weak atheist, because you now bear the burden of your proof, and if the subjectivism of the listener disagrees with you, your entire justification for being atheist goes out the window in his opinion, along with your supposed atheism. If your justification doesn't hold up one way or the other, must you not be required by epistemic ethics to reconsider your atheistic position?

[That is precisely the challenge laid upon us by theists who attempt to debunk your justification; but you are probably going to disagree with him as he disagrees with you, even thought you may not be able to defeat his justification.]


*Dr. Quentin Smith of Western Michigan University, wrote about "defeated
justifiers," and more inportantly about the one syllogism that must remain
undefeated by theists if the naturalist is to have a justified argument. We
cannot let thests have ground, except as is found in their historical
pre-Augustinian role as the skeptical position of naturalism.


"Where N means "naturalism":

"When contemporary science and naturalist philosophy,
conjoined with an evaluation of contemporary theist arguments for "not-N," can be said to justify N;
"and where in fact this conjoining does justify N;
"then N is justified."
[See 13., 14., 15., under "Justifications," in
"The Metaphilosophy of Naturalism" by Quentin Smith
http://www.philoonline.org/library/smith_4_2.htm

[This is where the formatting mistakes begin.]

"This [gnostic] narrower conception of atheism is often thought by many (erroneously) to represent the entirety of atheism itself. Because strong and weak atheism are often called 'types' of atheism, some people develop the mistaken idea that these are somehow akin to 'denominations' of atheism, not unlike denominations of Christianity. This serves the bolster the myth that atheism is a religion or a belief system. This is unfortunate, in particular because the label of “types” is not entirely accurate; rather, it is simply used due to a lack of better terminology."

[I have thought all along that "strong" and"weak," and the actual epistemic propositions supporting them, were due to a lack of better terminology and denotational accuracy. That means: get the definitions in taxonomic order.]

"To call them different types is to imply on some level that they are separate — a person is either a strong atheist or a weak atheist."

[Is that not what Cline has been trying to tell us all the time???? Duh. It was right there in front of us all the time, because he said it. Then he denied it. If that is not what he means, what does he mean? Well...]

"If we look more closely, however, we will note that almost all atheists are both on various levels." [italics added]

[OMG, now you divide more? How many times can atheism be divided? You are not an Atomist--not that you ought to be--if you believe they are indivisible infinitely. Every "genus" must have at least two "differentia." (Ayn Rand) So every time you make a division of two into two more divisions, you create a new genus with two new differentia. (There comes a point when there is no point to the next genus; or, to one of the new differentia, which then would automatically disqualify that genus.)

[Since "almost all atheists are both on various levels," this proposition recombines two genuses, making them as indistinguishable as are the many combinations of Empiricists with Rationalists. That, then, eliminates one genus of "atheist."

[Rand herself, I suspect, would eliminate them to one genus with two differentia. I quote Rand (cut and paste):"concepts are not to be multiplied beyond necessity—the corollary of which is: nor are they to be integrated in disregard of necessity." “The Analytic-Synthetic Dichotomy,”Introduction to ObjectivistEpistemology. That is called "Rand's Razor." Yes, she had her own, similar to Occam's. What they also had in common was that each had justified true belief in the metaphysics of essences as concepts, vs. Aristotle's/Aquinas' essences as "things in themselves."

[But by the same token, they are to be integrated only by necesssity. This is because we sometimes make errors of judgment caused by lack of data; or by any means of misjudging the truth. We can multiply as often as is necessary, but we should not re-integrate in haste. We are not saints. Men do not claim to be infallible. Infallibility is for the gods. We are not gods; "We wake to the world of Men." (MarcusAurelius)]

"The primary indication of [all atheists being both on some issues] can be seen in that the definition of weak atheism, lacking belief in the existence of any gods, is in fact that basic definition of atheism itself. What this means is that all atheists are weak atheists. The difference, then, between weak and strong atheism is not that some people belong to one instead of the other, but rather that some people belong to one in addition to the other. All atheists are weak atheists because all atheists, by definition, lack belief in the existence of gods. Some atheists, however, are also strong atheists because they take the extra step of denying the existence of at least some gods."

[This is an "unnecessary" division with no justification. Such people who are in denial of at least some gods, allow therefore the possibility that some gods do exist. This is not a division of atheism; it is agnosticism.]

"Technically, saying that “some” atheists do this isn’t entirely accurate. Most, if not all, atheists are willing to deny the existence of some gods if asked — few only “lack belief” in the existence of Zeus or Apollo, for example."

[And those who are not willing to deny the existence of all gods are agnostic.]

"Thus, while all atheists are weak atheists, pretty much all atheists are also strong atheists with respect to at least some gods. So is there any value at all in the terms? Yes — which label a person uses will tell you something about their general inclination when it comes to debates about gods. A person who uses the label “weak atheist” may deny the existence of some gods, but as a general rule isn’t going to take the step of asserting the nonexistence of a particular god. [!] Instead, they are more likely to wait for the theist to make their case and then examine whether that case is credible or not."

[But because of the divisions of "weak" atheists, we are still in the position of having to ask this "weak atheist" to determine for us which position he takes on this or on that.]

"A strong atheist, on the other hand, may be a weak atheist by definition, but by adopting that label the person is in effect communicating a willingness and interest to take a much more proactive role in theological debates. They are more likely to assert right up front that a particular god does not or cannot exist and then make a case for that, even if the theist doesn’t do much to defend the position of belief."

AustinCline, About.com http://atheism.about.com/od/atheismquestions/a/strong_weak.htm

Why I am An Atheist by Curtis Edward Clark

I am an atheist, not primarily because a of disbelief,whether positive or negative; nor from a belief, whether positive or negative. Rather, I am atheist because I do not sacrifice my reason to religious faith.

Religious reason is something else altogether. For one thing, it is the "religion" of Deism, the "religion" of the Founding Fathers of America. Do you know why it is not a "religion" in the dogmatic sense? Because each man or woman was allowed, under Deism, the absolute religious freedom to believe what he/she wanted in the pursuit of Reason. http://www.deism.com/deism_defined.htm

If that individualistic belief was anything other than in search of reason, then it was tinged with faith, and therefore suspect until the character of the individual had been assessed. Atheism as a religion is the merely the same religious freedom when granted to atheists, no more, no less. It is the belief, whether Deist or atheist, that is within the bounds of epistemic reason, of the individual sovereignty of each to believe in his own ideas.

It is within the bounds of "organized religions" that each person is advised to believe, not in his/her reason, but in the dogma. Witness the political candidates who are forced to choose between politics and their church, and choosing politics are told not to come to Communion.

Those in the eighteenth century who could not bring themselves to sever their beliefs from their church were theists, yet were trusted as much by Deists as the Deists trusted themsleves. They went to church with those theists, had discourse with them, voted for some of them in politics and in church affairs, and married together; but those who could and did sever themselves from the politic of the church they attended were called Deists.

Atheism can be religion when "religion is a frame of reference to man’s life and a code of moral values, [such as during the time] before men graduated or developed enough to have philosophy. And, as philosophies, some religions have very valuable moral points. They may have a good influence or proper principles to inculcate, but in a very contradictory context and, on a very—how should I say it?—dangerous or malevolent base: on the ground of faith. “Playboy’sInterview with Ayn Rand,” March 1964.

That was Rand's opinion, with which I agree. Deists, however, did not have belief in God, as supernatural religions have. Deists had justified true beliefs (undefeated justifiers) and were not dangerous or malevolent in their overall beliefs. Not, at least, on the grounds of faith, because they had no faith, as do no atheists. But a Deist has justified true belief in God, instead. Atheists have justified true beliefs that the existence of a creator is a contradiction to the Primacy of Existence, even if they have no idea what that amounts to and even if they have never heard it. State it to an atheist, and he will say, "That is what I've always felt."

The atheist has no reason to justify the existence of a God that to him is neither an epistemic truth, nor an object of metaphysical knowledge. So they each have a "sound" syllogism, the Deist and the atheist, a soundness which comes from having chosen one of the fifteen "valid" syllogisms of post-Aristotelean logic. (Aristotle allowed 24.) And each of their undefeated justifiers can and will always defeat the evangelicals, when the defeat of theistic propositions is accomplished with formal syllogistic logic that meets the criteria for "valid" and for "sound."

But when the evangelical has as valid and as sound an argument, then, like atheists and Deists on one side of the opposed-to-religion coin, then the evangelical joins the Deist on the same side of the opposed-to-atheist coin.

Rand also had something to say about her own use of the word religion, which I agree with and which I use in the definition of the Free Assemblage of Metaphysical Naturalists. (See the first Academy of Metaphysical Naturalists' weblog, under "Archive." )


"[There is one] possibly misleading sentence . . . " Rand wrote, "in Roark’s speech:

“From this simplest necessity to the highest religious
abstraction, from the wheel to the skyscraper, everything we are and everything we have comes from a single attribute of man—the function of his reasoning mind.”

"This could be misinterpreted to mean an endorsement of religion or
religious ideas. I remember hesitating over that sentence, when I wrote it, and deciding that Roark’s and my atheism, as well as the overall spirit of the book, were so clearly established that no one would misunderstand it, particularly since I said that religious abstractions are the product of man’s mind, not of supernatural revelation."

Amen, as she herself said a few times. Since an atheist by definition says "religious abstractions are the product of man’s mind, not of supernatural revelation," then I say an atheist by any other name smells as sweet. And I affirm that atheists can have religious convictions, if those convictions do not attend the existence of a god of any nature, supernatural or "natural," as with Alexander the Great.

*Free will is here used as in "free will," both the kind attributed to man's ego; and the kind attributed to legal papers such as "free wills," or generically called "free will forms." http://www.google.com/search?sourceid=navclient&aq=t&ie=UTF-8&rlz=1T4GGQD_enUS290US290&q=free+will+form


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Thursday, August 21, 2008

Objections from an Eminent Naturalist

Yesterday, I wrote about differences in the descriptions of Naturalism, differences described both by Naturalists themselves, and by non-naturalists trying to drive a "wedge" between the various factions of Naturalists. (I failed to use the word "wedge," although I did refer to it in my 5-part series on "Secularity." 8.11-8.16.08. This wedge "is a political and social action plan authored by the Discovery Institute, the hub of the intelligent design movement," according to Wikipedia. More on this tomorrow.)

But yesterday I used a quote from the Stanford Enclyclopedia of Philosophy, which in part read that various contemporary philosophers "interpret ‘naturalism’ differently," that "‘naturalism’ is [ ] a positive term in philosophical circles—few active philosophers nowadays are happy to announce themselves as ‘non-naturalists’," and that "Those philosophers with relatively weak naturalist commitments are inclined to understand ‘naturalism’ in a unrestrictive way..." http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/naturalism/index.html#note-1

One of those who work with a less "restricted" view of naturalism than does this Academy is Tom Clark of Naturalism.Org http://www.naturalism.org/ and The Center for Naturalism http://www.centerfornaturalism.org/ , which has a prestigious Advisory Board including Daniel Dennet and Susan Blackmore among thirteen listed, as well as a long list of "Allies of Naturalism," and a list just as long of "Contributors to the CFN qualifying as Allies of Naturalism (and wanting to be listed as such)." Some of my favorties are among them, including Julian Baggini, whose book, "The Philosopher's Toolkit" is one of my favorite quick reference books. Baginni is the co-founder of "The Philosophers' Magazine" http://www.philosophersnet.com/.

Now, none of this is relative to what comes next, but it was important for the reader to understand that Nat.Org and CFN.Org are well-known and much more established than is this Academy or its blog. We are not even toddlers yet, let alone walking among the "adults" in this field.

But Tom and I have been communicating, and it seems that some of that "unrestrictive" nature in the science comes out when I read Smith's work and he reads mine! It has led to some points of interest for both of us.

"I’m wondering about your prominent link," Tom wrote me, "to the Ayn Rand Institute on your blog. They strike me as being pretty irrational when it comes to ideas about the self and free will, and it seems to me this irrationality supports a morally objectionable radical individualism, see my critique here. "

It was "Part 4" of a series of very short pieces which together go by the name of "Libertarianism and the Myth of Radical Autonomy." I'm not a big fan of Libertarianism, not since I read Ayn Rand's scathing critique of it as having forgotten its epistemic roots, shooting only for the metaphysics, and shooting from the hip without regard for means, ways, and ultimate ends.

I don't know how much of the Party has come around to Rand's way of thinking to amend their ways by referencing the philosophical tenets from which the Party ought to have been conceived. Their ends are proper and all in the advancement of freedom, but at what costs, asked Rand, when the epistemic ends have been ignored or forgotten?

I clicked on the "here" link, only to find a piece I had read some time ago and forgotten about in the meantime. So I re-read it, made notes of my objections to his objections, and wrote back to him.

"Dear Tom: I can see your problem with Objectivism. I have encountered it many times. I don't often have the opportunity to address it."

Part of Tom's objection to Rand's firm reliance on the concept of "free will" was addressed this way: "...there’s no way to square Objectivism’s ostensible commitment to scientific objectivity, reason, and anti-supernaturalism with the idea of a self-made soul."

I wrote in return, "Where Rand says, 'As man is a being of self-made wealth, so he is a being of self-made soul," she most definitely does not mean that we create our soul as we might create another foot, both of which are impossible.

"In the same way that the mind is said to be tabula rasa at birth, so is the soul. The soul being self-made comes from this:

'Since man has no automatic knowledge, he can have no automatic values; since he has no innate ideas, he can have no innate value judgments. [ ]
"Man is born with an emotional mechanism, just as he is born with a cognitive mechanism; but, at birth, both are "tabula rasa." It is man's cognitive faculty, his mind, that determines the content of both.' The Virtue of Selfishness

"And:

'Long before he is old enough to grasp such a concept as metaphysics, man makes choices, forms value-judgments, experiences emotions and acquires a certain implicit view of life. Every choice and value-judgment implies some estimate of himself and of the world around him—most particularly, of his capacity to deal with the world. He may draw conscious conclusions, which may be true or false; or he may remain mentally passive and merely react to events (i.e., merely feel). Whatever the case may be, his subconscious mechanism sums up his psychological activities, integrating his conclusions, reactions or evasions into an emotional sum that establishes a habitual pattern and becomes his automatic response to the world around him. What began as a series of single, discrete conclusions (or evasions) about his own particular problems, becomes a generalized feeling about existence, an implicit metaphysics with the compelling motivational power of a constant, basic emotion—an emotion which is part of all his other emotions and underlies all his experiences. This is a sense of life. [ ]
'It is only those values which he regards or grows to regard as "important," those which represent his implicit view of reality, that remain in a man's subconscious and form his sense of life.'
The Romantic Manifesto

"It is in this manner [I wrote,] that is the mechanism for the "self-making" of the soul."


Part of Tom's criticism of what he calls "radical autonomy" in Rand's concept of the self-made soul was this:


"Science shows that individuals in all their aspects and capacities are fully a function of their environmental and biological determinants, not literally self-made. True, once we become autonomous, rational agents, it’s usually our own desires that determine our choices, including some choices that may influence our very character and values." [italics added]

My reply to that: "A man does not have to live with the education about society that he picks up from his family and friends; he can learn to live better if need be. In the same way, using your virtues to become a better person, to acknowledge the affairs of others when to do so is in one's interests, in short, to become a stronger and more virtuous character with an integrity that is better than before, is how a man makes his own soul.

"Or he leaves it to chance. He remains mentally passive and merely reactive, accepting his automatized reactions as if they were not subject to question."


These differences between Tom's assessment and mine of Rand's free will are major stumbling blocks for the many critics of Objectivism. I'm not certain if these criticisms come from casual readings of her material, or from something inherent in Rand's method of writing. I know that when I had such questions of her philosophy I could always find the answer in something else she wrote, as if she had picked up on her own thoughts there and addressed them here in realtionship to the current topic here on which she was writing about.

Now, perhaps I am mis-readind Tom, when I infer his inclination to believe that somehow Rand actually meant that "self-made soul" was in the same fashion as "self-made wealth," that somehow, just as a person can begin penniless and create a fortune he can begin without a soul and somehow fashion it from this or that and put it into his conscience or into his heart. It is difficult for me to believe that anyone could read Rand's words and take them that way.

But straightening out such misconceptions is what the free exchange of ideas is about, and I'm grateful to Tom in this case for showing me in just what fashion Rand can be mis-read. The rest of Tom's paragraph backs up his reading of Rand. (I won't call his a "mis-reading." We are all free to understand what others write and say in our own fashion, and it may be that after my letter to him he is unmoved to change his interpretation of what he has read.)

But his interpretation in Part 4 into the subject of "radical" free will goes much deeper:

"But there are two errors here," he writes, "in addition to thinking we’re ultimately self-made. One is to suppose that in empirical fact we are merely self-interested creatures. But we aren’t; there are many altruistic bones in our body.[2] Second, it’s to commit the naturalistic fallacy of arguing that if we are selfish by nature, that means we should be selfish. But there is no direct implication from a natural is to an ethical ought."

Until then, I had no idea that anyone thought of this as either an "ethical ought" or as a "naturalistic fallacy." Given that there are so many widely varying descriptions of Naturalism, I am hardly convinced that all Naturalists accept this "ought." I, for one, have never accepted it, and I'm a life-long Randian, at least, since high school some 36 years ago.

"On the subject of our 'altruistic bones,'" I replied, "I think Rand was much more aggressive in her definition of 'altruism,' [than you may be,] accepting [Auguste] Comte at his word."

I pasted a definition from the "Dictionary of Philosophy," Runes, 1942, which attributed the origination of the word altruism to Comte, and said in part:
"For Comte Altruism meant the discipline and eradication of self-centered desire, and a life devoted to the good of others; more particularly, selfless love and devotion to Society. In brief, it involved the self-abnegating love of Catholic Christianity redirected towards Humanity conceived as an ideal unity. As thus understood, altruism involves a conscious opposition not only to egoism (whether understood as excessive or moderate self-love), but also to the formal or theological pursuit of charity and to the atomic or individualistic social philosophy of 17th-18th century liberalism, of utilitarianism, and of French Ideology. "
[Wilbur Long]
http://www.pragmatism.org/genealogy/cambridge.htm

"By this standard," I wrote in my email, "even your own pursuit of charity seems out of the question as a topic of debate, or it may apply [only] to Rand's own thinking: she never said the question was, 'Should men ignore the plight of those in need?' She always maintained that the proper question was, 'Do you have the right to refuse to help?' to which Comte's altruism would say no to."

Now, in a previous email convo, Tom and I discussed his humanist approach to Naturalism, because, as is the case with many of the various "versions" of Naturalism as hinted at by http://plato.stanford.edu/ in yesterday's essay, I could not comprehend where humanism of even a "soft" form of altruism fit into any concept of the science of Naturalism. When I questioned him about this, he replied:

"If you read the Guide to Naturalism and the Q&A, that will be a start in understanding where the progressive, humanistic implications come from in this version of naturalism. Others who have seen these implications (Spinoza, Darwin, Einstein) are quoted here. There are several contemporary philosophers that also take this view, among them Derk Pereboom, Tamler Sommers, Joshua Greene and Bruce Waller."

Again, I had no idea. I've been walking around in a world in which I believed Naturalism was the opposite of Creationism or its earlier incarnations. I didn't know that "progressive humanism" was attached to it by anyone, let alone by so many.

"To the question of are we 'morally required to pursue our self-interest?'," I continued, "it begs the next question: What is our best-interest?

"If my best interest is in helping to prevent my town from being flooded, I'm going to be shoulder to shoulder with everyone else who is filling sandbags. If my self-interest is in eliminating illiteracy--if only so more people can read my works, then I will be helping illiterate people to learn to read.

"But 'to commit the naturalistic fallacy of arguing that if we are selfish by nature, that means we should be selfish,' is the definition of 'logical' egoism, not 'rational' egoism.
See
http://www.iep.utm.edu/e/egoism.htm ," I said. I am not, at this point, certain whether or not Tom knew there was a difference. Perhaps that was as much news to him as the "progressive humanism" was to me. I highly doubt that many of Rand's admirers or detractors are aware of the various "versions" of egoism.

"If," I wrote, "your logic is a reaction to the philosophy of Rand and other's, I understand the reaction. I began reading Rand in 1973, and often made the same mistakes of assumption I believe you are making. I had to read and re-read many other Rand passages to come to an understanding of how compassionate she could really be.

"Oddly enough, my post today, [8.19.08 ], is titled 'Who is John Galt: A Naturalist's Letter to a Critic,' and it addresses many of these concerns of whether or not Rand had any compassion or capacity for emotion."
Sincerely,
Curtis Edward Clark


Tom's short, simpl reply was, "Ok, many thanks for these clarifications, most interesting. It would be nice if all Rand’s acolytes examined her philosophy as assiduously as do you, ending up with more nuanced conclusions about the legitimacy of compassion and limits of egoism."

Well, it is my desire that Rand is not taken to be such a harsh philsopher than anyone could mistake her writings for anything less than "compassionate." Her entire philosophy presupposed that if one was objective enough in his/her dealings with other people and the world at large, that those who deserved compassion would get it as a result of the rational egoism of him/her who was dealing with the world; and that those who were egotistic or altruistic or tyrannical would come to a just end, or find their way like Pilgrim did in his walk of Progress, and as I have been finding my way among the many various factions of Naturalism.

I consider Tom Clark to be an eminent Naturalist. He has his objections to egoism, believing al egoism to be the same, as I once believed all Naturalism to be the same.

I can say that the compassion of my Objectivism would not allow me to help a person in dire and immediate need to save his life. But my compassion does not always apply to those who will not help themselves. I don't know yet how far Tom Clark's compassion goes. I have yet to read most of those links he provided me with. I certainly intend to read them all.

To be an "informed' Naturalist, one must know all of the objections made by those with eminent power to defeat one's own principles in argument, and understand how to prevent one's justifications from such defeat.

Maybe after I read all the links, I will happily discover that Tom and his famous associates and I are more or less on the same page. Until then, I can only confess to remaining confused as to how anyone can misread the rationality and compassion of Rand. When I want to meditate and immerse my sense of self and of the compassion Rand saw was capable of being brought forth by men, I simply take a few minutes and read and read and re-read Chapters 11 and 12 (11 especially) from "Anthem," which in part reads:

"...to earn my love, my brothers must do more than to have been born. I do not grant my love without reason, nor to any chance passer-by who may wish to claim it. I honor men with my love. But honor is a thing to be earned.
"I shall choose friends among men, but neither slaves nor masters. And I shall choose only such as please me, and them I shall love and respect, but neither command nor obey. And we shall join our hands when we wish, or walk alone when we so desire. For in the temple of his spirit, each man is alone. Let each man keep his temple untouched and undefiled. Then let him join hands with others if he wishes, but only beyond his holy threshold.
"The word "We" is as lime poured over men, which sets and hardens to stone, and crushes all beneath it, and that which is white and that which is black are lost equally in the grey of it. It is the word by which the depraved steal the virtue of the good, by which the weak steal the might of the strong, by which the fools steal the wisdom of the sages.
"I know not if this earth on which I stand is the core of the universe or if it is but a speck of dust lost in eternity. I know not and I care not. For I know what happiness is possible to me on earth. And my happiness needs no higher aim to vindicate it. My happiness is not the means to any end. It is the end. It is its own goal. It is its own purpose." http://www.noblesoul.com/orc/texts/anthem/complete.html

Please send all comments to mailto:freeassemblage@gmail.com
The Free Assemblage of Metaphysical Naturalists is the sm (service mark) of the
Academy of Metaphysical Naturalism tm, is the educational arm of the Assemblage.
This publication © 2008 by Curtis Edward Clark and Naturalist Academy Publishing ®

Sunday, August 17, 2008

Existence Exists: A is A; Concepts in Naturalism

Tautology: a thing that is "true by virtue of its logical form alone." (Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary. 2008.)

Logical truth. A statement which is necessarily true because, by virtue of its logical form, it cannot be used to make a false assertion. Example: "If neither John nor Betty is here, then John is not here." http://www.philosophypages.com/dy/t.htm#taug

Existence exists. This is generally what people mean when they use the definitions of "tautology" that are listed first in almost every dictionary, which are: "needless repetition of an idea, statement, or word," and "redundant" and "superfluous."

At first glance, to the uninitiated, "existence exists" does look redundant. But it is true by virtue of its logical form, which makes it important because besides being necessarily true, it is true about the first subject of metaphysics, "Being."

"Existence exists" is in the form of "A is A." This form is proper both gramatically and in its syntax. Any word that represents any subject can take the place of the first "A." Any word that is a predicate (i.e., tells something about the subject,) can take the place of the second "A." It is like math, where "A+B=C." You can put any number in "A" and in "B," but if "C" is incorrect then you have not put the proper values into one of the positions.

So we take "A is A" and we put words in the place holders "A" and "A." Apple is fruit. Sun is hot. But without being so primative, you can say "An apple" as the subject, or "The sun" or "Twenty dogs" or "Dancing ladies." But if the predicate that takes the place of the second "A" does not logically follow from the subject, then you are using the wrong word in one of the places. You have created a contradiction.

For example, "Dancing ladies are shaped like cows." That is not only not a tautology, it isn't true by virtue of the definition of the words. "An apple is fruit" is a not a tautology not because it does not make a "false assertion," but because you could have said "is red or green;" or "is round;" or "has seeds containing arsenic." "An apple is fruit" is a good part of the definition of an apple, but it is not the denotation; a denotation is the one definition that defines the essence of a thing. Many things are "fruit." The word "fruit" is generic to a lot of different foods, but something called a "differentia" takes a thing out of the generic and puts it into its own class all by itself.


That is to say, once you find the correct differentia it then puts a thing into its own class. Some of the differentia of "apple" are "round, red, green, juicy, tart, sweet," etc. One particular differentia is what sets the apple apart from all other entities in existence, and that one particularity is the denotation. A general dictionary like my Webster's gives the denotation of "apple" as "fruit of the trees of the genus Malus."


Pears don't come from Malus; nothing comes from Malus but apples. So that is the differentia that sets the apple apart from all other existents in existence. This is not a tautology. It says something about something, something that is not self-evident.


"Existence exists" is an axiom which states that there is something, as opposed to nothing. [ ] Existence is axiomatic because it is necessary for all knowledge and it cannot be denied without conceding its truth." http://www.importanceofphilosophy.com/Metaphysics_ExistenceExists.html "Exists" can be said to be the one predicate, the one differentia of "existence" that denotes "existence."


"Existence exists" is a tautology because it describes what seems to be self-evident. But because tautologies are axioms, they describe everything that has ever been known, is known, or will be known about a thing, in this case "existence." We can still learn much about the apple. Saying it is the fruit of Malus is not the full extent of what has been known, is known, or will be known about the apple. We know it is "delicious."

Existence cannot ever have "not existed." That is why the tautology is so important. To concede that existence could once have "not existed" is to concede a contradiction in terms. Even if you say that god created matter, heaven, and earth, it must be true that god existed; therefore god did not create existence.


(I am aware of the theological argument against this statement of naturalism, but in this context it is not germain. This theological argument could be one of the "defeators" as defined by Dr. Quentin Smith http://www.wmich.edu/philosophy/index.php?content=smith_faculty_profile , discussed in last week's series about keeping naturalism "secular." So it is an important theological objection against "therefore god did not create existence." Knowing this argument and how to rebut it would qualify as an "undefeated justifier for naturalism." But this is another subject for another day.)


Existence is defined by naturalists as a self-sufficient primary not in need of the supernatural for its presence nor its natural laws. Existence has always existed; but has this present universe always existed? Probably not. Man cannot fathom "infinite time." There could have been billions or trillions of universes before this one.But they all existed in existence; they could not have existed in non-existence. Therefore, existence has always existed, and the material form of it is ever changing.

Naturalism cannot deny the existence of existence. "A is A" is Aristotle's Law of Identity. It's like saying E=MC². It doesn't tell the whole story. It's just the code phrase. It is the conclusion of Einstein's long mathematical formula, its denotation. "A is A" is the shorhand for the Law of Identity, just as E=MC² is shorthand for the entire Einsteinean equation.


Aristotle's Law of Identity states: "These truths hold good for everything that is, and not for some special genus apart from others. And all men use them, because they are true of being qua being . . . . For a principle which everyone must have who understands anything that is, is not a hypothesis . . . . Evidently then such a principle is the most certain of all; which principle this is, let us proceed to say. It is, that the same attribute cannot at the same time belong and not belong to the same subject and in the same respect.
Aristotle, Metaphysics, IV, 3 (W. D. Ross, trans. Quoted from “The ‘Conflicts’ of Men’s Interests,” The Virtue of Selfishness ; Ayn Rand)



Let me repeat; the Law of identity is this: that the same attribute cannot at the same time belong and not belong to the same subject and in the same respect.


Naturalism relies on the identity of existence for all of its propositions. If "Existence did not exist" as a tautology, nothing about metaphysical naturalism would make any sense. Before Aristotle's formulation of the Law, it had to have been a sub-conscious concept in the minds of pre-Aristotelean philosophers who set the standards for the science of naturalism. Had it not been even sub-conscious, in other words, if the concept had not existed in any form in the minds of men, naturalism could not have been conceived.

Naturalism is the recognition that all things in existence including the laws of nature are "natural." Again, that sounds redundant, but that is only if you forget that the opposite of "natural" is "supernatural." So it means even the laws of nature do not rely on a supernatural entity to have created them, or to maintain them, or to cause them to work.


Existence for the metaphysical naturalist is the acceptance that existence has always existed, that it is primary, necessary, and impossible never to have existed; that it could not have been created. To accept that existence was once non-existent and had to be created means at one time it was nothing, that nothingness was a metaphysical entity, that nothingness was an existent and that it was existant.


If nothingness was once an existent, then language means nothing. Contradictions have validity in a world where non-existence is accepted as once having existence. Naturalism is the science of removing contradictions from the identity of all things in existence. Naturalism is the antidote to dogma, superstition, supernaturalism, and the contradiction that existence must have been created from the the nothingness of non-existence.

Please send all comments to mailto:freeassemblage@gmail.com
The Free Assemblage of Metaphysical Naturalists is the sm (service mark) of the Academy of Metaphysical Naturalism tm, which is the educational arm of the Assemblage.
This publication © 2008 by Curtis Edward Clark and Naturalist Academy Publishing ®



Thursday, August 14, 2008

The Loss of Secularism in Naturalism Part 5; Defeator Arguments

The case has been made that many naturalists are, in the words of Dr. Quentin Smith, http://www.wmich.edu/philosophy/index.php?content=smith_faculty_profile "uninformed," having an "unjustified true belief" in the ancient science. "The Metaphilosophy of Naturalism"; PHILO [see link in left column of this blog] http://www.philoonline.org/library/smith_4_2.htm

The ancient science is nothing less than calling a spade a spade, which in the words of Leonard Peikoff http://www.peikoff.com/ concerning existence is "a self-sufficient primary [that is] not a product of a supernatural dimension, or of anything else," with nothing being previous to existence, "its nature [ ] irreducible and unalterable." Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology ; by Ayn Rand. Piekoff defines it in its atheistic countenance, but even in its theistic trappings it is irreducible, unalterable, and "natural" in its working, in a form of molecules-to-man evolution in its epistemology.

"As Bertrand Russell's A History of Western Philosophy (1946) points out, philosophy and practical science were not originally separate. They were born together in the beginning of the 6th century BC and they both involved a transition from a theistic toward a natural way of thinking about the world." http://www.comnet.ca/~pballan/section1(210).htm

"The controversy [between the theists and the naturalists] erupted early in the 19th Century when geological discoveries implied that the earth is much older than was suggested by the contents of the Judeo-Christian Bible [ ] The profound impact of this early debate upon the popular mind was directly responsible for the 1857-1860 revival in protestant religious enthusiasm."
http://www.nationmaster.com/encyclopedia/Theistic-realism

In "the publication of The Genesis Flood in 1961, Dr. [Henry] Morris saw clearly that good science—the proper handling and interpretation of scientific evidence—would demonstrate the veracity of the biblical accounts of Creation and the Flood." [italics added]

"Today, thousands of creation scientists [can] be found in literally every discipline of science [ ] Evolutionists are finding it increasingly difficult to maintain the fiction that evolution is 'science' and creation science is 'religion.' Such statements today merely reveal the speaker's own liberal social philosophies—not his or her awareness of scientific facts." [italics added] http://www.icr.org/research/ The Institute for Creation Research, from which this quote comes, maintains laboratory facilities on its campus in Dallas, Texas. Its researchers and faculty http://www.icr.org/research/scientists_faculty/ are well-recognized in their fields.
In the "National Review," author Barry Freundel reviews the ideas of one of the latest and most controversial of these creationists, Phillip Johnson, and his book "Reason in the Balance." Johnson himself is also Program Advisor to Discovery Institute's Center for Science and Culture, UC Berkeley, where he is a law professor and former U.S. Supreme Court clerk, and holder of a named chair at Berkeley. (See below for "Discovery Institute.")

But before we get to any discussion of Johnson's book, we need a definition of Naturalism. "Carl Sagan summed up the philosophy in these words: 'The Cosmos is all there is, all there has been and all there ever will be.' A naturalist believes that nature is the whole show. There is no 'super-nature' (God). For sure a naturalist could talk about a pantheistic 'God' who is Life Force or Energy or even the Ground of Being, but not Creator. There is no place in a naturalist scheme for a God existing independent of nature, who created it and on whom it depends." http://www.geocities.com/Heartland/2964/reason.html

But this is not the view of many naturalists, though they may keep it out of their work. Most have some logical or emotional basis for a continuing belief in a deity, and they are not to be maligned for this.

"[R]eligion is an early form of philosophy, [ ] the first attempts to explain the universe, to give a coherent frame of reference to man’s life and a code of moral values, [ ] before men graduated or developed enough to have philosophy. And, as philosophies, some religions have very valuable moral points. They may have a good influence or proper principles to inculcate, but in a very contradictory context and, on a very—how should I say it?—dangerous or malevolent base: on the ground of faith."
“Playboy’s Interview with Ayn Rand,” March 1964 http://www.aynrandlexicon.com/lexicon/religion.html

And "faith" is the very nature of the disagreement between theists of any sort and naturalists of any sort.

"Explaining in great detail [ ] Naturalism and its deep flaws," [quoting Johnson,] Freundel claims Johnson makes a case that Naturalism is as much a religion as any other, if it means "a system based on unchallengeable orthodoxies. Indeed Naturalism may be more 'fundamentalist' than [ ]conventionally defined fundamentalism." The disagreements between naturalism and religion "is leading us toward a culture war [ ] when rational discourse breaks down and one side resorts to denigrating the other -- in this case, as "phobic," "authoritarian," and otherwise dangerous. Only by restoring the search for objective truth, and allowing all viewpoints a fair hearing, can we avoid such a frightening prospect." [italics added] http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1282/is_n24_v47/ai_17955372

Johnson, in his chapter "Theistic Naturalism and Theistic Realism", wants us to believe that "the much-hyped physical theory of everything may never be more than a myth (and in any case would explain disappointingly little)"; and that "scientists pursuing the grand project [ ] have refused to consider that there may be limits to what can be learned about reality through their methodology. [ ] Perhaps their dogmatic metaphysical naturalism has even led scientists to disregard some aspect of reality that is virtually staring them in the face. Could it be, for example, that living organisms (in Richard Dawkin's wording) 'give the appearance of having designed for a purpose' because in fact they are designed?"

To a creationist, this fallacious logic is all that is needed to write off naturalism as the denial of creationism, when no such thing is intended. Peikoff's definition of existence may belong to that of the atheists, but it is astoundingly true that "thousands of creation scientists [can] be found in literally every discipline of science," and that does not disclude the field of naturalism. One does not need to be atheist to believe that God created the universe with laws that allow for our understanding of a molecules-to-man epistemology.

"Scientific naturalists meet this shocking suggestion with one of two inconsistent responses," says the Discovery Institute. http://www.discovery.org/scripts/viewDB/index.php?command=view&id=358 "One is to make a few superficial debater's points against design and then declare the subject closed." This is precisely what Smith contends too many of us do with a wave of the hand. It is precisely the reason that in some quarters, creationism is winning, all too easily, and the very reason we naturalists must learn arguments that defeat the "defeator arguments" of the creationists. It is easy for us to see that the creationists often use fallacious, emotion-laced or based logic. But it is not as easy to overcome these fallacious objections in the real world when we ourselves have no understanding of how to defeat the creationistic logic that would have us becoming the skeptical position against theism, rather than what ought to be happening, which is reverting back to the pre-1967, pre-Plantinga era when theism was the skeptical position against naturalism.

The Discovery Institute quotes Johnson: "[T]he very atheistic physicist Steven Weinberg [says] '[T]he only way that any sort of science can proceed is to assume that there is no divine intervention and to see how far one can get with that assumption.'"

To "assume there is no divine intervention" may be the atheist platform of naturalism, but does not even attempt to overcome Johnson's defeators. This abdication of any dismissal of creationism denies the epistemic principle of existence as a self-sufficient primary, ignores logic that is assumed in the argument for Creation, and ignores (or affirms) that there must be the possibility that before Creation there was "nothingness" as the only existent.

But the sound conclusion is that "nothingness" cannot be reified into an existent. Thus, according to this hypothesis by Weinberg, there is the tacit admission that "nothingness" was once a reified existent, and that we need to "see how far we can get" with that illogical assumption.

For any committed creationist, Johnson's argument is this: "On the contrary, the very notion of 'natural law' grew out of the concept of a lawmaker."

I must, myself, assume from ignorance that this is where Augustine and Plotinus had such an effect in reversing the roles of naturalistic world view to being the skeptical position of theism, as Smith alludes to in PHILO.

This "very notion," of the concept of a lawmaker, Johnson says of biology as he uses one example, "will not only survive but prosper if it turns out that genetic information really is the product of preexisting intelligence. Biologists will have to give up their dogmatic materialism and discard unproductive hypotheses like the prebiotic soup...Freed of the metaphysical chains that tie it to nineteenth-century materialism, biology can turn to the fascinating task of discovering how the intelligence embodied in the genetic information works through matter to make the organism function." [italics added] How many naturalists can argue that while it is our job to discover such nature embodied in genetic information, that this natural intelligence is not divinely created but is an act naturalistic molecules-to-man, even if he/she must maintain a belief in the supernatural creation of the molecules themselves, as many naturalists do?

Yet, for all his subjectivity, Johnson makes the astonishing declaration that, "If there really is a materialist explanation for the origin of life, or the human mind, it surely will be found by a scientist who resolutely ignores the objections of people like me and persists in looking for it."

His theme in this book may come when he writes, about the current state of naturalist knowledge, that "the managers of the enterprise may be confident that a smashing success is just around the corner," then undercutting that by saying the epistemic problem "is deciding when to stop believing [the] promises of eventual success, particularly when the managers have been successful in the past.

"How can we tell who is correct? ...the solution is not to grant the insiders the exclusive privilege of auditing themselves. I do not urge scientists to give up on any theory or research agenda until they themselves are convinced that further efforts would be fruitless."

This is why the Discovery Institute calls it "shocking [ ] to make a few superficial debater's points against design and then declare the subject closed." Johnson wants the debate. He knows as well as Quentin Smith does that most committed naturalists are "uninformed" with "unjustified true beliefs." He thinks his creationistic arguments will hold up in this increasingly de-secularized, evangelical atmosphere in which our society now exists. He's probably right.

Johnson gives us our due on the one hand, then undercuts it with the other. "In view of the cultural importance of the naturalistic worldview, however, and its status as virtually the official philosophy of government and education, there is a need for informed outsiders to point out that claims are often made in the name of science that go far beyond the available evidence." [italics added]

So Johnson also uses the word "informed" to designate himself and others like him who can defeat our arguments. But what do they use as defeators? The fall-back position of saying, "Naturalists have not proved this or that, we are going beyond our own proofs into supposition, and therefore the creationists must maintain their own belief that a blind watchmaker is not the cause of what we propose.

But he labels such attempts such as the scientist who resolutely ignores the objections of people like him and persists in looking for naturalistic proof--and finding it--attempts at working with "heuristic assumptions," or assumptions that provide help in the solution but that are not independently justifiable or provable. And yet, if they are not provable, how can the scientist who ignores critics like Johnson find that there "really is a materialist explanation for the origin of life?"

"How can we tell who is correct?" Johnson asks. "[T]he solution is not to grant the insiders the exclusive privilege of auditing themselves."

But it never has been the exclusive privilege of any science to audit itself, because every science has an impact in one way or another on the other sciences and on the arts and humanities in general, not to mention that more generalized philosophers of epistemology must set the standards. (Smith, himself, is a professor of, among other things, epistemology.)

"Science was born as a result and consequence of philosophy; it cannot survive without a philosophical (particularly epistemological) base. If philosophy perishes, science will be next to go," wrote Ayn Rand. "It is not the special sciences that teach man to think; it is philosophy that lays down the epistemological criteria of all special sciences." http://www.aynrandlexicon.com/lexicon/science.html It makes one wonder what the epistemological criteria must be for Johnson's odd defence of creationism. He seems to find it in his desire for the naturalists to go on toiling, maintaining "the fiction that evolution is 'science' and creation science is 'religion;'" or that "creation science" which assumes the supernatural ought to go about attempting to prove supernaturalism; in the desire that naturalists go on "pursuing the grand project;" or that we refuse "to consider that there may be limits to what can be learned about reality through [naturalistic] methodology."

I know of no naturalist who would claim there are no limits. The state of science changes all the time, and the methodology of the twenty-first century is not the methodology of the Atomists.

No, the epistemology seems to be in the attitude that a little bit of evolutionism is not so worrysome.

To "Johnson and his ilk [a] new adaptation here, a lost adaptation there--who cares?" writes Michael Ruse in "Naturalistic Fallacy" Reason Magazine http://www.reason.com/news/show/30010.html " Rather, it is the very moral fiber of the nation that counts. Let in evolution, and pornography, abortion, and sodomy are next. Or rather, because we let in evolution, pornography, abortion, and sodomy are now. Johnson starts with an introduction to the enemy [as those] 'who assume that God exists only as an idea in the minds of religious believers [,that] humankind created God--not the other way around. In that case, rationality requires that we recognize the Creator as the imaginary being he always has been, and that we rely only on things that are real, such as ourselves and the material world of nature."

That is exactly Smith's point when he writes, "The four goals of the informed naturalist are i) retrieve naturalism from its de facto reclassification by medieval philosophers; ii) reclassify the philosophy of religion as a subfield of naturalism, viz. skepticism about naturalism, so that the position in the various fields of philosophy formerly occupied by 'the philosophy of religion' is replaced by the field 'the philosophy of naturalism;' iii) to understand in outline an actually extant version of original naturalism (Greco-Roman naturalism) that these original naturalists justifiably believed to be an informed naturalism and which contemporary informed naturalists justifiably believe is approximately the best that could be done by naturalists in the epistemic situation of Greco-Roman philosophers; and iii) A third goal is to understand in outline an actually extant version of original naturalism (Greco-Roman naturalism) that these original naturalists justifiably believed to be an informed naturalism and which contemporary informed naturalists justifiably believe is approximately the best that could be done by naturalists in the epistemic situation of Greco-Roman philosophers; [and] iv) to justifiably reformulate, and answer, the two basic ontological why-questions that medieval philosophers took over from the Greco-Roman naturalists, and which have (for the most part) remained ever since 'questions asked in the field of the philosophy of religion.' The successful accomplishments of these four tasks will restore academia to the mainstream secularization it possessed before the post-1967 breakdown in the field of philosophy."

"This retrieval [i] is also a reversal. The aim is that theism be justifiably reclassified as a subfield of naturalism, namely, as a skepticism about the basic principles of naturalism whose refutation serves to stimulate and further develop the naturalist program. 'Philosophy of religion' disappears, to be replaced by a new subfield of naturalism, namely, 'skepticism about naturalism,' with skeptical arguments being put forth and argued against, with the aim in mind of further developing the argumentative foundations of the naturalist world-view."

"[T]he most basic answers to the ontological why-questions in a certain naturalist theory permit the two most basic why-questions, formulated in the following way, to be positively answered, [and] then that theory is explanatorily complete.

"Q1. Why do these things exist and why do these laws of nature obtain rather than some other possible things and other possible laws of nature?

"Q2. Why is it the case that there is not only nothing? (The reason for formulating the question this way will become apparent when I discuss the atomists.)" [For that discussion, please read Smith's paper in the link at the top of this blog.]

Clearly, we "uninformed" naturalists have a long way to go. Not being in academia, I have long believed that my naturalism was "justified true belief." But then, I do find myself in a different class from most naturalists who are either agnostic or have some form of belief in a creator.

My argument for naturalism runs this way, as I said above and have said on many past occasions: existence is self-sufficient, primary, the given, and is "self-existent, self-explanatory, self-operating, and self-directing, that the world-process is not teleological and anthropocentric, but purposeless, deterministic (except for possible tychistic events), and only incidentally productive of man [Greek Atomism]; that human life, physical, mental, moral and spiritual, is an ordinary natural event attributable in all respects to the ordinary operations of nature; and that man's ethical values, compulsions, activities, and restraints can be justified on natural grounds, without recourse to supernatural sanctions, and his highest good pursued and attained under natural conditions, without expectation of a supernatural destiny," http://www.ditext.com/runes/n.html because anything less that this denotation would require that "nothingness" be the original state of existence and it is an epistemic contradiction to insist that "nothingness" was at one time an existent, the thing that existed before existence existed. There can be no "thing" in existence before existence allowed for the conditions necessary for a "thing."

"Existence and identity are not attributes of existents, they are the existents . . . . The units of the concepts “existence” and “identity” are every entity, attribute, action, event or phenomenon (including consciousness) that exists, has ever existed or will ever exist." Ayn Rand: Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology

The deductive syllogisms by which we uninformed naturalists must come to discover are the "defeators" of our beliefs, defeators which prevent our beliefs from being "justified and true" beliefs, Smith lays out in his paper:

Where "N (a thesis). Naturalism, i.e., the thesis that there exist inanimate or animate bodies, with animate bodies being either intelligent organisms or non-intelligent organisms, but there exists nothing supernatural; then

"A (a defeated justifier). A is the argument that contemporary science and naturalist philosophy are known to be probably or certainly true, even though A includes no counterarguments against contemporary arguments for theism: or

"DA (a defeater for the justifier A). DA is a sound argument that argument A is unsound; or

"B (a defeated justifier). B is an argument that, contemporary science and naturalist philosophy, when conjoined with an evaluation of contemporary theist arguments for not-
N, (where “not-N” implies naturalism is not true) justify not-N; or

"C (an undefeated justifier for N). C is the argument that, contemporary science and naturalist philosophy, when conjoined with an evaluation of contemporary theist arguments for not-N, justify N.

"According to the informed naturalist, the predicament of at least ninety-nine percent of contemporary naturalists is represented in the following columns. We can state very briefly the arguments different philosophers believe in terms of our symbols. The mentioned belief states are arguments believed to be sound by the relevant parties.

"Belief State of Most Contemporary Naturalists
1.A.
2.A justifies N.
3.Therefore, N is justified.
Defeater Recognized by Informed Naturalists
4.DA.
5.DA defeats A.
6.Therefore, A does not justify N.
Belief State of Most Contemporary Theists
7.B.
8.B justifies not-N.
9.Therefore, not-N is justified.

Defeater Recognized by Informed Naturalists
10.DB.
11.DB defeats B.
12.Therefore, B does not justify not-N.

"Since both A and B are defeated, most contemporary naturalists, as well as most contemporary theists, hold defeated beliefs about the truth-value of naturalism. The informed naturalist knows the complex argument C that constitutes the defeater of B and the justification of N, as well as meets other conditions explained later in this paper.

"Belief State of Informed Naturalists
13.C.
14.C justifies N.
15.Therefore, N is justified.

"Some naturalists believe they are informed naturalists. But whether they are in fact informed naturalists is not an issue I am addressing in this paper. This paper is a metaphilosophy of naturalism, not a philosophical argument that naturalism is true. Such philosophical arguments can be found in other papers and books. In this paper, I am (in part) characterizing the contemporary epistemic situation about naturalism from the point of view of a real or hypothetical informed naturalist."
We real and hypothetical informed naturalists have a great deal of work ahead of us.


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