Consciousness, and Intentionality

All references indicate a problem of semantics with the word "intentionality", but consciousness must be consciousness of something. There are two stages of "intentionality": that which occurs at birth, and that which comes after consciousness of being conscious.
 

"But here [in the semantics] the difficulty lies partly in the fact that the relevant use of cognate terms is simply not that found in common speech (as when we speak of doing something ‘intentionally’)." http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consci…

This problem in semantics is better explained this way: "Every intentional state is mental, but not every conscious mental state is intentional. For example, one may have feelings of anxiety that do not have any intentional content. http://science.jrank.org/pages/9796/Inte…

"Philosopher Franz Brentano has suggested intentionality or aboutness (that consciousness is about something). However, within the philosophy of mind there is no consensus on whether intentionality is a requirement for consciousness."
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Consciousne…

That "consciousness is about something" can be explained if you consider that any 'intentionality' (of any semantic persuasion) absolutely requires consciousness---after we become conscious of it:

"Concepts and, therefore, language are primarily a tool of cognition—not of communication, as is usually assumed. Communication is merely the consequence, not the cause nor the primary purpose of concept-formation—a crucial consequence, of invaluable importance to men, but still only a consequence. Cognition precedes communication............."
Ayn Rand  http://aynrandlexicon.com/lexicon/langua…

Cognition precedes intentionality, because without consciousness one cannot have any intentions, no matter which semantic definition you use. 

 The question seems to be this:
Does some 'intention' of mind cause consciousness? 

But it can only be answered by acknowledging that the brain is hard-wired at birth to 'intentionally' seek objects of cognition, just as the lungs are hard-wired to seek oxygen and the liver is hard-wired to strain the blood stream.

But there is the matter of retaining intentionality after one become conscious of being conscious. Drugs and alcohol are only two of the means people use to try to eliminate their own intentionality.

But it still comes down to which semantic definition you use. "...within the philosophy of mind there is no consensus on whether intentionality is a requirement for consciousness." I think we can see that at birth there can be no intention that requires a reasoned purpose for it, but only one that is hard-wired. Because "Concepts and, therefore, language are primarily a tool of cognition—", it is at that point that it would seem we can choose to maintain our individual, purposeful "intentionality" or let it go.

Ardi Pithecus ™,
The Academy of Metaphysical Naturalism ^sm,
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and   The Metaphysical Naturalist ©,
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©2008-2010 by Curtis Edward Clark and, Naturalist Academy Publishing, ^sm

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Reviewing the Terminology of Naturalism's Classifications

I made some additions a few days ago to the Wikipedia page "Naturalism (Philosophy)". One editor was not pleased, immediately deleted all my comments, and said he detected that I had an "agenda".

He was correct; I do have an agenda. It is to correct definitional differences between various pages of Wikipedia on the subject of naturalism; but more than that, to discover whether or not there exists a class of naturalists who are not "pluralists" or "dualists" yet who accept the natural first-person experiences of such "mental states" as mind, consciousness, ego, soul, volition (free will), and emotions.

After the deletion of my material in Wikipedia because of arguments I later thought might have some merit, not in terms of "agenda" but in the possibility that what I had written was incomprehensible or its purpose was incomprehensible, I began some investigating to see whether any other author was already "on to" the same subject of reviewing the terminology used in the science and in the metaphysics.

I immediately discovered "The Rediscovery of the Mind" by John R. Searle (MIT). When I read, "How is it that so many philosophers and cognitive scientists can say so many things that, to me at least, seem obviously false?", then I knew I was at least (and at last!) reading an author who thought like me. Whether or not I would agree with his review of the terminology and with his conclusions and professional recommendations for altering the terminology would have to be determined after I read the book. I'm only a little way into the book, but it seems I am not the only one who does not see "materialism vs. dualism" as the only way out of the morass.

Please read the Journal entry titled "Journal of the Academy of Metaphysical Naturalism" for the mission statement of this newly titled url, and then feel free to make serious and relevant comments. All points of view are welcomed.

Curtis Edward Clark

The Academy of Metaphysical Naturalism ^sm,
Journal of the Academy of Metaphysical Naturalists ©,
The Academy of Metaphysical Naturalism Blogger ©,
Academy of Metaphysical Naturalism Blogger Extra © and
The Metaphysical Naturalist ©,
are the educational arms of
The Free Assemblage of Metaphysical Naturalists LLC,
and are:
©2008-2009 by Curtis Edward Clark and, Naturalist Academy Publishing, ^sm

mailto:freeassemblage@gmail.com